Bolshevism and Poland

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\ "W1NCENTY LUTOSLAWSK1

BOLSHEVISM
AND POLAND

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! PARIS — JUNE 1919 ===

CHIEF WORKS BY W. LUTOSLAWSKI

Erhaltung und U itergang der Staatsverfassungen nach Plato, Aris-
toteies und Machiavelli. Breslau 1888.

The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic, with an account of Plato's
style and of the chronology of his writings. London, New York and
Bombay, Longmans, Green S? Go. 1897.

Ueber die Grundvorausset^ungen und Consequençen der individua-
listischen Weltanschauung. Helsingfors 1898.

Seelenmacht, Abriss einer çeitgemâssen Weltanschauung. Leip-
zig, 1899.

Platon jako twôrca ideali^mu i socjali^mu. Warszawa 1899.
wychowaniu narodowem. Krakôw 1900.
Z dped?iny Mysli, studja filojoficjiie. Krakôw 1900.
Eleusis, c^asopismo elsôw. Krakôw 1903.

Logika ogôlna, c^yli teorja po^nania i logika formalna. Krakôw 1906.
Ludfkosc Odrodfona, wijje pr^ys^tosci. Warszawa 1910.

Volonté et Liberté, Paris, Alcan, 1913.

The Polish Nation, Paris, Boyveau et Chevillet,' 1917.

Gdansk and East Prussia. Paris, 1919.

Lithuania and White Ruthenia. Paris, 1919.

La conscience nationale et la ligue des nations. Paris, 19L9-

v A,

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PREFACE

The wave of social unrest which goes through the world
and prevents us from enjoying peace, has its hidden sources
in Germany, and in Bolshevist Russia, The agitation which
makes the working men believe that they can indefinitely
increase their salaries and reduce their hours of work, uses
everywhere to a great extent the funds which the Bolshevists
have robbed in .Russia and Ukraine.

German money has created in Eastern Galicia the Rutheno-
Ukrainian party which prétends to represent thirty millions
of Ruthenians, who mostly know nothing of the Galician
politicians speaking in their name. German money has created
the Bolshevist révolution in Russia and has supplied the
Bolshevists with the necessary sophisms, paradoxes and fal-
sehoods in order to poison the life of the Russian working
man and to destroy the work of générations. Germany has
still money enough to organise armies against Poland, and
has men enough to supply Ruthenians and Bolshevists with
officers. And Germany succeds in persuading the Allies that
a strong Poland is not necessary, and that a strong Germany
will pay the war debt sooner than a Germany conscious of
defeat.

Every concession made to Germany prevents the cons-
ciousness of defeat, without which there is no peace for
the world. The Allies seem to have forgotten every thing
that they have learnt about the Germans during thé war..
They are anxious to please the defeated enemy. They did not
allow the Polish army formed in France to reach Poland

through Dantzig. They did not respect the expert' s opinion
twice reasserted,- that Dantzig should belongto Poland. They
offer further concessions to Germany at the expense of Poland ,
and they are not aware that in 1919, as in i683, a strong
Poland is the only hope of Europe against oriental despotism,
whether this despotism be called Tsarism or Bolshevism.

Poland is weakened by the loss of Dantzig, it is threa-
tened by other losses, and is calumniated by the Germans
and Jews ail over the world. The Jews forgét that in no
country in the world have they been treated better, and that
in 1905, when they suffered 700 true pogroms in Russia,
there was only one place in Poland, where there was a
disturbance created by Russian officers, and that, in that
one place, in Siecllce, Pôles lost their lives in defending
the Jews (1). In vain honest Jews, like Samuel Tilles, the
président of the Jewish community in Cracow, (2) protest
against the false accusations against the Pôles. The British
Foreign Office believed doubtful reports before there was
any possibility of verifying [them (3). In vain some British
papers warn the public against such credulity (4).

It is not surprising that in some places, the Pôles may
have been tempted to carry out on a small scale what has
been so persistently ascribed to them. [If an individual is
persistently calumniated, he may be_ tempted to make the
calumny true (5), should this furnish an opportunity of
punishing the calumniator. The same thing may happen
to uneducated masses brought to despair by famine, if those
who have caused the famine prétend to have been wronged.
But Poland remains, and ,will remain, the safest refuge tor
the Jews, when in Russia and Germany they will be called

to account for their deeds. And nobody can deny now, after

"

(1) See Abraham Grûnberg, Ein Jùdisch-Polnisch-Russisches Jubi-
laeum. Der grosse Pogrom von Siedlce im J. 1906, Prag 1916.

(2) See his letter published in Nowa Reforma on March 24, 1918.

(3) See the Times of Nov. 29, 1918.

(4; See the New Witness of Nov. 29, 1918.
(5) See Echegarray El Gran Galeoto.

the publication of the British White Book on Bolshevism,
that Jews have been the chief leaders of the criminal gang
which has destroyed for a long time to corne the resources
of Russia, and which murdered thousands of Pôles carried
away to Russiajby the retreating Russian armies (i). When
the Pôles were murdered by the Jews^ in Russia, no
meetings of indignation were held in Western countries,
and npbody drew the conclusion that Russia did not deserve
freedom and independence, because she tolerated the rule
of murderers and robbers for such a long time.

But such influential associations as the American Jewish
Committee, and the Zionist Organisation of America, pré-
tend that the Pôles have shown themselves unflt to govern
their own country, and they ask international control of
Poland in order to secure the safety of the Jews!

Such claims are not made in the interest of the Jews.
The Jews of Poland know very well that they are safe. They
calumniate Poland only to save Germany, because a strong
Poland is the only remedy against German militarism, and
German war is an excellent business for the Jews of ail
countries. No people has won so much money through
the war as the Jews, in Poland as elsewhere. When in
Cracow in April 1918, the population had no bread, the
Jews bought, at extravagant prices, the flour which could
still be got from the peasants, in order to export it to Ger-
many.

Germany does not feel beaten, and discusses the terms
of peace as an equal with equals, not as a criminal nation
awaiting the deserved punishment. As long as there is no
strong Poland, Germany will dominate Russia, and prépare
another war. In order to prevent the existence of a strong
Poland, an unprecedented campaign of calumnies and

(1) Arnong those victims were two younger brothers of the author,
Marjan and Jôzef Lutosîawski, who devoted their lives to the Polish
cause and had discovered the secret treaty by which the Germans
authorised Bolshevist propaganda in Poland.

— 6 —

Bolshevist indignation meetings has been undertaken throu-
ghout the world.

It is worth while to consider seriously while there is
yet time, what the conséquences to the .world will be, if the
world sacrifices Poland again to the greatness of Germany
and Russia, under the strange delusion that a territorially
strong Germany will pay sooner a big war indemnity.
For the world's peace it would be safer to give up every
hope of any pecuniary indemnity, and to reduce to the
utmost the territory over which the Germans rule.

There is not the slightest probability that the Germans
would be ill-treated by the Pôles, the Tchèques, the Danes
or the French, even if many Germans remained in such
territories as have been once seized by them, but which ought
to be restituted to the nation from which they have been
taken. There is a certainty that Pôles, Danes or Tchèques
who remain under German rule will be treated as the
Germans have always treated their victims.

The conséquences of every weakness in the final délimi-
tation of Germany's future boundaries become évident if we
draw the natural conclusions from the British White Book
on Bolshevism. The danger to European civilisation has not
decreased since the pathetic appeals made by British and
neutral diplomats to the Foreign Office in 191 8. The end
of Bolshevism in Russia is no guarantee against similar out-
breaks elsewhere. On the contrary, the Bolshevists, when
they see that they can draw nothing more from Russia, will
use elsewhere their considérable accumutated spoils, and the
expérience acquired by their agents. The danger will increase
for the world at large when it will seem to be at an end for
Russia. And this danger will continue for a long time, even
when we shall apparentjy be at peace. Bolshevism has edu-
cated a légion of anarchists who will not suddenly be con-
verted into lawabiding citizens.

Should Bolshevism fail, its alternative is autocracy.
Without a strong Poland, nothing will prevent Germany

and Russia from joining their forces in order to form a very
powerful Empire; Russia has revealed her weakness, and
such weakness cannot be ftealed in a single génération, as
it represents the passivity of the population, and opens the
field for German rule in Russia and Asia.

The author of this pamphlet invites ail his readers to
send their names and addresses if they wish to receive
further publications on the subject. In view of the interna-
tional Bolshevist organisation which threatens the social peace
of the world, it is désirable to unité those who understand
the danger, and who wish to apply the remedy.

W. LUTOSLAWSKI.

Château Barby p. Banneville, June 6 th. igig
Haute-Savoie
France

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BOLSHEVISM AND POLAND

1. — The British White Book on Bolshevism.

The officiai collection of reports on Bolshevism in Russia,
published in April 1919 by the British Government*, contains
many warnings by compétent witnesses, that the Russian
outbreak threatened the whole of European civilisation, if the
Allies did not stop the contagion by their energetic interven-
tion.

' - - * -

Opinion of the Netherlands Minister.

The Netherlands Minister at Petrograd wrote already on
September 6 th. 191$: (page 6 of the White Book).

« The danger is now so great that I feel it my duty to call
the attention of the British and ail other Governments to the
fact that if an end is not put to Bolshevism in Russia at
once, the civilisation of the whole world will be threatened.
This is not an exaggeration, but a sober matter of fact.... I
consider thaï the immédiate suppression of Bolshevism is
the g.eatest issue now before the world, not even excluding
the war which is still raging; and unless, as above stated,
Bolshevism is nipped in the bud immediately, it is bound to
spread^n one form or another over Europe and the whole
world, as it is Oiganised and woiked by Jews who have no
nationality, and whose one object is to destroy for their own
ends the existing order of things. The only manner in which

* Price 9 d.. H. M. Stationery Office, Impérial House, Kingsway,
London, W. C. 2.

— IO —

this danger could be averted, would be collective action onthe
part of ail the Powers.

I am also of opinion that no support whatever should be
given to any other Socialistic party in Russia, least of ail to
the Social Revolutionaries, whose policy it is at the moment
to overthrow the Bolsheviks, but whose aims in reality are
the same : to establish prolétariat rule throughout the
world. »

Mr. Lockharts summary.

Similar are the chief points sent by Mr. (Lockhart to
Mr. Balfour two months later, on November 10 th. 1918.
He says : (p. 1 1-12).

« i-The Bolsheviks have established a rule of force and
oppression unequalled in the history of any autocracy.

2. Themselves the "fiercest upholders of the^ right of free
speech, they have suppressed, since coming into power, every
newspaper which does -not approve their policy. In this
respect the Socialist press has sufferea 1 most of ail. Even the
papers of the Internationalist Mensheviks, like « Martov »,
have been suppressed and closed down, and the unfortunate
editors thrown into prison or forced to fiée for their lives.

3. The right of holding public meetings has been abo-
lished. The vote has been taken awây from everyone except
the workmen in the factories, and the poorer servants, and
■even amongst the workmen, those who dare to vote against
the Bolsheviks are mai ked down by the Bolshevik secret police
as counter-revolutionaries, and are fortunate if their worst
fate is to be thrown into prison, of which in Russia today it
may truly be said : « many.go in, but few corne out ».

4. The worst crimes of the Bolsheviks have been against
their Socialist opponents. Of the countless exécutions which
the Bolsheviks have carried out, a large percentage has fallen
on the heads of Socialists who had waged a life long struggle
against the old régime, but who are now denounced as
counter-revolutionaries, merely because they disapprove of
the manner in which the Bolsheviks have discredifed
socialism.

5. The Bolsheviks have abolished even the most primitive
forms of justice. Thousands of men and women have been

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shot without even the

trial, and thousands

more are left to rot in the prisons under conditions, to find a
parallel to which, one must turn to the darkest annals of
Indian or Chinese history.

6. The Bolsheviks have restored the barbarous methods
of torture. The examination of prisoners frequently takes
place with a revolver at the unfortunate prisoner's head.

7. The Bolsheviks have established the odious practice of
taking hostages. Still worse, they have struck at their poli-,
tical opponents through their women folk. When recently a
long list of hostages was published in Petrograd, the Bols-
heviks seized the wives of those men whom they could' not
find and threw them into prison until their husbands should
give themselves up. J

8. The Bolsheviks who destroyed the Russian army, and
who have always been the avowed opponents of mititarism,
have forcibly mobilised officeis who do not share their poli-
tical views, but whose technical knowledge is indispensable,
and by the tbueat of immédiate exécution have forced them.
to fight against their fellow-count.ymen in a civil war of
unparalleled horror.

9. The avowed ambition of Lenin is to create civil war-
fare throughout Europe. Eveiy speech of Lenin's is a denun-
ciation of constitutional methods, and a glorification of the '
doctrine of physical force. With that objeçt in view, he is
destroying systematically, both by exécutions and by delib-
erate starvation, every form of opposition to Bolshevism.
This system of « terror » is, aimed chieny at the Libérais
and non-Bolshevik Socialists, whom Lenin regards as his
most dangerous opponents.

10. In order to maintain their popularity with the work-
ing men and with their hired mercenaries, the Bolsheviks
are paying their supporters enormous wages by means of an
unchecked paper issue, until today money in Russia has
naturally lost ail value. Even according to their own figures^,
the Bolsheviks' expenditure exceeds the revenue by thousands
of millions of roubles per annum.

Thèse are facts for which the Bolsheviks may seek to
find an excuse, but which they cannot deny* »

Colonel Kimens on Bolshevism.

Colonel Kimens, acting British Vice Consul at Petrograd y
writes two days later, on November 12 th. 1918 (p. 20) :

« Practically no différence is being made now betweens
Russians and foreigners; they have to do forced Tabour; the
flats are requisitioned, and occupants obliged to leave them
at a few days notice; the furniture may not be removed, as.
it has been declared national property, and clothes and pro-
visions, above a small minimum, are confiscated.

The state of affairs in Russia is becoming daily more
critical, and the reign of terror is assuming proportions
which seem quite impossible, and are incompatible with
ail ideas of humanity and civilisation. Government, properly
speaking, has ceased to exist in Russia, and the only work
done by the Soviet authorities is the inciting of class hatred r
requisitioning and confiscation of property, and destruction
of absolutely everything, and world propaganda of Bolshe-
vism. Ail freedom of word and action has been suppressed;:
the country is being ruled by an autocracy which is infini-
tely worse than that of the old régime; justice does not
exist, and every act on the part of persons, not belonging to
the « prolétariat », is interpreted as counter-revolutionaiy
and punished by imprisonment, and in many cases exécu-
tions, without giving the unfortunate victim a chance ot
defending himself in a tribunal, as sentences are passed
without trial....

The expropriation of land has led to a very considérable
decrease of crops, the nationalisation of factories to a stand-
still of industry, the seizure of the banks to a complète
cessation of money circulation, and the nationalisation of
trade to a deadlock in that branch of the économie life of
the country, so that nothing is being produced, and then
the system of the présent policy of confiscation will be applied
on an increasing scale, as the dissatisfactibn of the masses
cannot be admitted, and the popularity of the authorities
must be kept up.

' The intention of the Government is to rule on thèse Unes
as long as possible, and afterwards to cany it on in other
neighbouring countries, and as there are strong Bolshevik

ttendencies in Poland *] the Ukraine, the Baltic provinces and
in Finland, the danger is very great indeed that Bolshevism
-will spread in those countries. In that case it will be impos-
sible to. stop the movement which présents a danger to the
•civilisation of the whole world ».

Mr. Lindley on Bolshevism.

After more than one year of Bolshevist rule, Mr. Lindley
Tvired to Mr. Balfourfrom ArchangelonNovember 27 th, 1918:
(p. 21 of the White Book).

« It seems clear that no Government as at présent consti-
rtuted can safely have dealings with a body of persons whose
object is to overturn interests of Governments, especially
:those whose broad démocratie base makes them most solid,
and who have shown that no agreements they make will be
allowed to stand in their way....

« The principal reason why Bolsheviks have lasted so
Hong, is their unlimited supply of paper money, and I venture
;to recommend that particular attention be paid to this side of
the problem. This paper money enables them, not only to
pay their way in Russia, but to build up crédits abroad,
which are to be used to produce chaos in every civilised
country. It is the first time in history that an anarchist society
ihas unlimited resources..

« I am absolutely convinced nothing is to be gained by
.ha'ving dealings with Bolsheviks. Over and over again they
Jiave shown themselves devoid of ail scruples, and if it is
inconvénient to punish their crimes and rid the world of
ithem by force, the only alternative, consistent with selfrespect,
is to treat them like pariahs. »

Mr. Alston to Lord Curzon.

/

Two months later 'Mr. Alston wired to Earl Curzon on
January 23 rd. 1919:: (p. 28).

« The Bolsheviks can no longer be described as a politicai
party holding extrême communiste views. They form a rela-
*ively small privileged class which is able to terrorise the rest

* There are no Bolshevist tendencies in Poland, but many Bolshevist
.agents with immense means, who came from Russia in order to
tdestroy Polish liberty..

of the population, because it has a monopoly both of arms
and of food supplies. This class consists chiefly of workmen
and soldiers, and includes a large non-Russian élément, such
as Letts and Esthonians and Jews; the latter are specially
numerous in higher posts. Members of this class are allowed
complète licence, and commit crimes agaïnst other sections
of society ».

Other witnesses.

We read further a statement made in the Foreign Office
onFebruary i3 th. 1919, by reliable witnesses, arrived recently
from Russia : (p. 41).

« Bolshevism in Russia offers to our civilisation no less
a menace than did Prussianism, and until it is as ruthîessly
destroyed, we may expect trouble, strikes, and révolutions
everywhere. The German military party are undoubtedly
working hand inhand with Russian Bolsheviks, with the idea
of spreading Bolshevism ultimately to England, by which
time they hope to have got over it themselves, and tb be in
a position to take advantage of our troubles. For Bolshevik
propaganda, unlimited funds are available. No other country
can give their secret service such a free hand, and the resuit
is that their agents are to be found where least expected ».

Rev. Lombard on Bolshevism.

We may conclude thèse extracts with the instructive
testimony of the Rev. B. S. Lombard, who writes on March
23 rd. 1919, to Earl Curzon, and thus sums up the aims of
Bolshevism, *which he says « originated in German propa-
ganda and was, and is being, carried out by international
Jews ». Their aims are : (p. 56).

« Radically to destroy ail ideas 01 patriotism and nation-
ality by preaching the doctrine of internationalism which
proved successful amongst the uncultured masses of the
labouring classes.

To obstruct by every means the création of military power r
by preaching the ideas of peace, and to foster the abolition of
military discipline.

To keep the masses under the hypnosis of false Socialistic
literature.

. <. • ' . ' _ ■ - • 1 ' /

To buy up ail nationalisée! banks and to open everywhere
branches of German Government banks under the names
and titles of firms that would conceal their actual standing.

To endeavour to impoverish and temporally to weaken
the peasant classes, to bring aboû't national calamities, such
as épidémies (the outbreak of choiera last summer was traced
to this source), the wholesale burning down of villages and
settlements.

To preach the doctrine of the Socialisée form of manag-
» ing enterprises among the working classes, to encourage
their efforts to seize such enterprises, and then, by means of
bankrupcies, to get them intô German hands. •

To preach the idea of a six to eight hours' working day
with higher wages.

To crush ail compétition set on foot against them.

Ail attempts of the intellectuals or other groups to under-
take any kind of independent action, or to develop any
industries, to be unmercifully checked, and in doing this to
stop at nothing.

Russia to be inundated by commission agents and other
German représentatives, and a close network of agencies and
offices should be created for ,the purpose of spreading
amongst the masses, such views and teachings, as may at any
given time be dictated from Berlin. »

Thèse voices of compétent witnesses, who have seen the
working of Bolshevism in Russia, ail agrée that Bolshevism
is an international danger, and it becomes, therefore, a very
important question to know which other nations are most
seriously threatened, and where we may expect the greatest
résistance to the Bolshevist contagion.

We shall try, therefore, nrst to state briefly, according
to the materials contained in the officiai publication, what
Bolshevism is, and why it has been so successful in Russia.
This will enable us to judge whether a Bolshevist révolution
may be expected in Germany, and what means can prevent it.

11. — General characteristics of Bolshevism.

Foreign and antinational character of Bolshevism.

The £rst thing thaf strîkes every impartial enleokcr *s tne-
foreign criaracter ôf the Bolshevists* in Russia, Most of thé
leaders of Russian Bolshevism are Jews- (lâtéê p. 32, 33, 56, 5*7,
65, 68 of the officiai report), and Lenifî, although Russian by
birth, has no patriotic feelings of any kind, He is so thorough-
ly fascinated by the Jewish-German doctrine of Marx, though
it is completely misunderstood by him, that he has lost ail
contact with the Russian people, and seems to have become
a very fanatical Jew himself, like Trotzky and his other com-
panions.

Nothing especially Russian in Bolshevism. ^

We may therefore safely afflrm that there is nothing espe-
cially Russian in Bolshevism, and that Bolshevism is not at
ail an outcome of Russian life or history, as was the tsarist
autocracy, though certain conditions made it easier for the
Bolshevists to undertake their experiment in Russia than
anywhere else. The antinational character of Bolshevism is
also shown by the fréquent use they make of foreign troops,
such as Letts and Chinese (the Letts are mentioned p. 7, 19,
23, 24, 38, 41, 43; the Chinese p. 19, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 38),
because they distrust the Russjans. The wilful destruction of
ail national assets and of the national crédit for some time to
corne, prove equally the antipatriotic and antinational cha-
racter of Bolshevism.

Insincerity of Bolshevists.

The Bolshevists do not always sincerely confess their hate
of national life, national enthusiasm and national indepeu-
dence, but [they show clearly theii tendency to destroy national
différences, and to bring ail nations under the absolute rule
of a few leaders. The moral character of thèse leaders becomes
évident, if we consider the extensive use made by the Bolshe-
vists of lies and falsehoods, false promises and obligations
which they do not mean to keep. They have publicly boasted
that no treaty binds them.

They do not represent the workmen*

Their greatest lie is the false pretence that they represent
the manilal workers of the land, or as they call them after
Marx, the prolétariat. They use the working class only as an
instrument for their own aims, without any regard for the
interests of this working class. The Russian peasant, recently
enrolled in manufacturies, is easily misled, as he is very
credulous, and for that reason only he has become a welcome
instrument of the Bolshevists, who, as a rule, do not corne
from the working class themselves, and have never done
anything for the working class.

They have done great harm to labour.

They cannot ignore that the stopping of every industrial
production, the upkeeping throughout the whole country of
the greatest insecurity, and the destruction of most intelligent
organisers of labour, cannot improve the conditions of the
workmen. They could have learnt from Marx, had they not
known it themselves from the beginning, that every violent
interférence with the natural évolution of industry is useless.
They have deceived the workmen wilfully, in order to obtain
the necessary material force for the réalisation of their own
plan, which had not the advantage of the working class in
view, but only the beneflt of the rulers.

Gontempt of superiority.

Another characteristic of the Bolshevists, is their déniai of
the social value of intelligence, éducation, talent and every intel-
lectual, moral or spiritual superiority. They teaeh such false-
hoods as : any workman can be put at the head of a factory;
schoolboys can elect and dominate their teachers; alsubal-
tern officer can become the chief commander of an army;
any uneducated agitator can be given a high office in the
Government. This false doctrine can have no other aim than
to destroy ail order in society, because anarchy and disorder
facilitate wholesale robbery, and the wilful murder of num-
berless victims.

Use of false names and faise money.

For the same purpose the Bolshevists use false names.
They disguise their foreign origin by taking Russian or

Polish names, to which they have no right. A Jew calls him-
self LitwinofF, another takes the kingly name of Leszczynski,
because they wish their true names to be unknown in order
that they may be taken for Russians or Pôles. For simirar
reasons, they falsify the paper money which they émit, and
do not sign the new banknotes which they print, but imitate
the old notes of the Tsar or of Kerenskij. They do not ac-
knowledge their Government to be what it is, a Jewish
oligarchy, but prétend that it is a dictature of the Russian
prolétariat.

•

Misunderstood Marxism.

They prétend to give to the world a new social doctrine,
a saving gospel, and in reality there is not a single original
thought in ail their writings, which are nothing else than a
travesty of Marxism. Marx had a certain conception of the
future évolution of économie life, and he gave a picture of
the final stage, which, according to his opinion, would be
reached after centuries of évolution. Lenin takes this picture
from JVJarx, and prétends to suddenly introduce, into a very
unripe society, without any évolution, what Marx understood
to be a probable resuit of long stiuggles. As Marx is a dis-
ciple of Hegel, évolution is a essential point of his doctrine,
while his conception of the final stage is not at ail essential;
in fact, the real development of économie conditions has
shown that Marx was wrong in supposing that capital would
be concentrated in few hands, while in reality the number of
small capitalists has steadily grown and has rapidly increased
during the war. Lenin ignores thèse facts and wishes sud-
denly to nationalise èverything. Some of his followers even
wish to nationalise women, considering ttem as property,

not as free beings.

•

Marx and Lenin.

Thèse extrêmes, mentioned in officiai reports, show
cleaiiy that if we consider Bolshevism as a doctrine at ail, it
is not a serious social theory, thought out in pursuit of truth
or human happiness, but a mere caricature of a mistaken
.point in the doctrine of Marx. Marx recommended class
warfare, Lenin attempted the destruction of ail classes, except

unskilled workmen and irrresponsible chiefs. Marx expeeted,
in a distant future, the State ownership of the means of pro-
duction, Lenin wishes to reduce the producers themselves
to slavery; not for the benefit of the masses, but only to satisfy
the unbounded ambition for power of a few ringieaders.

False analogies.

It is certainly a false pretence of the Bolshevists, if they
compare their undertaking with the French Révolution, or
with any other similar great social movement. They have
no positive plan or programme of reforms, except the hatred
and denunciation of the bourgeois; and they call bourgeois
every educated person, every refined artist or scholar, whereby
they only show their inability to understand Marx's real
doctrine of an inévitable struggle between labour and capital.

Wrong appréciation of talent.

They show aiso an incredible stupidity when they believe
that men of talent will work for them under compulsion and
menace of death. Talent requires liberty, and slavery kills
invention. The Bolshevists have no créative power, and no real
originality, therefore they cannot understand the only condi-
tions under which créative work, initiative and invention are
possible.

$ i ~ ■' '' . . . : • • n ' • *: J:

Shortsi^htedness of Bolshevists .

" . ' • ' .' , . y h ' < »■ ■ ■ • ' '■ *»..

They hate liberty, and do not admit free expression of
public opinion, which to them is always a manifestation of
counter-revolution. They could not stand the existence of a
constituent assembly of legitimate représentatives of the
people, and they prétend to represent the people, without
havingthe slightest right to speak in their name. Their short-
sightedness leads them to such measures as the limitless
émission of forged banknotes. They paid immense salaries
to their partisans, but thèse salaries became worthless,
because the money paid by the Bolshevists represented no
value whatever. Their spirit of greed, hatred and vengeance
made them entirely blind to the conséquences of their actions.

Frightfulness, cruelty and rage of destruction. v

They have carried to extrême limits the German pratice

— 10 —

of frightfulness, and have beaten every record by their cruelty
and rage of destruction, with the utmost disregard of any
possible advantage to the country in which they are ruling, or
to mankind in gênerai. As they could not always find Rus-
sians able to carry out their inhuman orders, they resorted,
to the Chinese, known for their soulless delight in inflicting
tortures. A very peculiar characteristic of Bolshevism is
cruelty to women and children. Many children were tortured
to death, or burnt in their homes; délicate women of refined
society were obliged to wash dirty linen, and were violated;
men wère skinned and burnt.

- - < TCbé

Torture.

The accounts of thèse acts of violence and cruelty are
numerous and fully reliable. (See pp. 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 34
35, 36, 46, 47, 49 of the officiai reports). Bolshevist prisons,
where men, women, girls and, children are kept without
food or fuel, in appalling conditions, are themselves a kind
of torture, which has killed many of the weaker victims.
(See pp. 2, 5, 6, 7, 14, 18). But this is not enough for the
^ vindicative spirit of Bolshevism, and they have often inven-
ted spécial means of torturing their victims to death, by
exposing them naked to freezing water, or by resorting to
the worst recorded examples of inhuman cruelty.

Best citizens killed, others morally debased.

The Bolshevist rule has as its inévitable conséquence the
destruction of educated and refined people, especially of
those whose feeling of dignity forbids them to witness acts
of injustice and wanton mischief without protest. The popu-
lation left in a country after a year or two of Bolshevism,
will be weakened by famine and incapacitated for work,
unruly and to a great extent morally insane. The masses
will haveiost their habit of working and their consciousness
of duties to fulfil. The few surviving educated people will
have lost their faith in social progress or reform of any kind.
It will be difficult in such a country to find enterprise and
initiative for the reconstruction of normal social life. A
people deprived of its educated classes sinks down to the
level of animal life, and thinks only of food and lust.

Destruction of wealth.

But not only the human material of a country will be
deteriorated by Bolshevist rule. A great many homes will
be destroyed by fire and burglary, many records of légal
relations will have undergone partial or total ruin, priyate
archives, libraries, and collections of Art will have been
treated as fuel. In-great cities the Bolshevists prétend to
care specially for the préservation of treasuries of art and
science, but this again is.one of their many false pretences,
because they destroy wealthy homes with ail their contents,
and if they préserve some libraries or collections, they
entrust them to such absolutely incompétent guardians,
• that much damage will certainly be done. We may fear
that any country, after a protracted rule of Bolshevists, will
be deprived of its best men, of its most refined families, of
its records of the past, and of nearly everything that has
been the work of générations. Widespread famine will
prevail, and the deficiency of cattle, horses and machinery
will make it very difficult to bring agricultural production
to its normal efficiency. Skilled workmen will have emigrated
in great numbers and the resumption of productive work
will be extremely difficult.

§. .. -.
Inévitable reaction.

Reconstruction will be possible only under military rule
enforcing respect of the law. A very reactionary government
must corne after a period of arbitrary despotism of the
uneducated masses. Every kind of liberalism, radicaHsm,
socialism and even republicanism will certainly be discred-
ited through the abuses of Bolshevism. Whatever Goverment
will restore order, it will be obliged to concentrate ail its
care on agriculture, and agriculture of the most primitive
kind, because a country ruined by Bolshevism will not soon
be able to develop its industry. Having very limited exports,
such a country will, for a long time be unable to import
•machinery, to repair destroyed houses and railways, or to
further popular éducation. A few years of Bolshevism may
throw a whole country back to the most primitive conditions
of existence.

Instability of Government.

A bolshevised population will not have the stability of
rules and traditions which we nnd among the savages-
Distrust, disobedience, and anarchy will; for years, cause
great instability of government. Even the strongest govern-
ment cannot last, when in the population ail respect for
authority is lost. We shall therefore witness in such
countri.es fréquent changes of government, a succession of
révolutions, a great instability of State boundaries, as in the
South American Republics, after their émancipation from
the Spanish despotic and arbitrary government, which,
in history, has been the nearest approaçh to Russian
Bolshevism.

• •'■ ■ ' -\ - - • - • -:.'-c*|

Succession of dictators.

The so cailed dictatorship of the prolétariat leads to the
arbitrary dictatorship of ambitious individuals, who will fail
one after another to restore a durable order. This is a
gênerai déduction from the character of Bolshevist rule,
as it has been manifested on a large scale in Russia. If a
gang of Bolshevists succeed in ruling a country for some

111. — Bolshevism in Russia.

Wrong analogies from Russian history.

Now let us consider the reasons why Bolshevism has been
able to succeed in Russia, for this will lead us to probable
conclusions as to its possible success in other countries.
We must first of ail beware of looking upon Bolshevism
as a peculiarly Russian product. Some Russians are under
this delusion, and compare the Bolshevist rule from 191710
igigwith the so called smutnoje wremia from 1610 to i6i3,
when much destruction of wealthy homes by peasants had
also taken place. But there did not then exist a single
centralised government in Russia, with a great army and
developed bureaucracy, as exists under the Bolshevist rule.
Destruction was not so widely spread, nor accompanied by

such perverse cruelty. Nor can we compare with Bolshe-
vism the various revolts of peasants which have taken place
from time to time in Russia, as under Pugaczew or Stienka
Razin. They were always local affairs, and never pretended
to reform the whole of mankind.

Bolshevism brougbt from Germany.

Bolshevism was not born in Russia; it was brought from
Germany and started with German funds. Until lately the
Bolshevist leaders remained very faithful to their German
masters, and the German Embassy could protect ail genuine
Germanophils against the worst outrages of Bolshevists.
It took a long time before Lenin and Trotzky emancipated
themselves from German rule ; even in 1918 they immedia-
tely avenged the murder of Mirbach, the German repré-
sentative.

Favourable conditions for Bolshevism.

However it is not by accident that the Jewish-German
organisation of the gang of Bolshevists had its first great
success in Russia. This does not mean that there is
anything Russian in Bolshevism, but simply that in Russia
Bolshevism found most exceptionally favourable conditions
for the réalisation of its plans.

Différence of class .

First of ail, in Russia, the différence between the unedu-
cated peasant and the high officiai of nobility was greater
than the différence between an English workman and an
English lord, vvho often read the same newspaper, and
have sometimes common political ideals. The Russian illi-
terate peasant, even if he became a workman in a factory,
lived in the greatest misery and had only the most elemen-
tary physical needs. The wealthy class in Russia, owning
large estâtes and occupying high positions in the admin-
istration, wronged the people in many ways, and they
created hatred and envy against themselves. Nowhere in
Europe was the différence of classes so great. This différ-
ence was increased by the irreligiosity of the upper classes
and the intense religiosity of the people. The industrial

population, though very often apparently irreligious, took
with religious fervour the gospel of socialism, which to
them became a faith, for which they were ready to live or
die. The educated classes had no faith whatever, and
lived in the most revolting selfishness.' The notorious
absence of patriotism in the leading classes deprived them
of every link with the people. The people looked on thèse
utterly selfish sceptics with contempt, .and had nothing in
common with them, neither religious convictions nor
national ideals. This was idéal ground for the doctrine of
class warfare and the destruction of the higher classes.

Uneducated masses.

•

The absence of éducation in the people, their illiteracy
and boundless ignorance, their hereditary degeneration by
drink, followed by the sudden introduction of total absti-
nence, their great credulity, bred by the influence of byzan-
tine christianity, were fùrther favourable conditions for the
success of an unscrupulous gang, who promised. wonderful
reforms, a paradise on earth, with plenty of everything and
no obligation to work.

Bureaucratie centralisation.

The great centralisation of the Russian empire enabled
Lenin, when he mastered Petrograd, to use the whole
bureaucracy of the Empire for the extension of his power.
Most of the old officiais of the tsar served the new Bolshe-
vist chiefs with the same passive obédience which they had
acquired during the autocratie régime, and they continued
toMevy illegitimate contributions called w\iatki, which were
usual in Russia.

Sensé of defeat.

Military defeat, with ail that it implied, the putting into
practice of Tolstoj's doctrine of non-resistance by the
soldiers, the treason of high officiais in German pay, the
gênerai feeling of despondency amongst the people, ail made
the task of the brigands easier, and enabled them to establish
an apparently stable government, which made laws and régu-
lations with almost the same rapidity as it issued forged
banknotes.

— 25 —

N© real patriote.

Ijf *in Russia there could have been found more men of
dignity and honour, real patriots, the people would not have
been so completely dominated by a gang of foreign unscrup-
klous bandits. But in Russia, the very noblest characterS
: suffered from hopeless scçpticism, and were unable to make
àny organised résistance. Many ôthers had as their only aim
their own officiai career, and the State was for them chiefly
the instrument which served to satisfy their personal ambi-
tions and interests. Very few cared about the people or
knew the working classes at ail. The landlords drew their
incomes from their estâtes, but very rarely lived on them.
Their agents oppressed the peasants in many ways.

IReligiosity of the people without direction.

In Russia there might have been one power only against
jBolshevism : the great religiosity of the people, if the people
had found in the clergy compétent educators. But this reli-
.gious people despised its popes, who. were morally and
dntellectually very much inferior to the Roman Catholic
priests or to the Protestant pastors of other countries, or
to the Rabbis of the despized Jewish population. The
-clergy had been atrophied by the government oi the Tsar
which used religion as one of the weapons of political
oppression. Thus the natural deep religiosity of the people
was left without compétent direction, and became ano-
ther favourable circumstance for the réalisation of the
Bolshevist plan.

Readiness for change.

The people, disgusted with the sad reality ot their own
life,were ready to accept any new faith which promised an
improvement on the existing misery. The Bolshevist gospel
was easy to understand* It pointed out a culprit — the
educated classes which had been really guilty of shameless
indifférence towards the people. It preached an easy re-
medy : the destruction of thèse educated classes with ail
theiF property and their accumulated riches. It opened fora
.time a great perspective of the equal distribution of wealth.

— 26 —

Miscalculation of results.

This wéalth appeared to the poor workmeri and pea-
sants as almost unlimited. Nobody was able to calculate how
Iittle the inclividual condition of the poorest could be improv^
ed by the arbitrary distribution of what could be taken
from the richest. The chief part of thèse spoils went to the
leaders, who used the confiscated wealth for their propa-
ganda in Russia and abroad, and for their own pleasure.

False information finds believers.

Numberless lies were disseminated in ail countries about
Bolshevism as a true redeeming gospel of social reform.
French socialists and some English pacifists took thèse lies
seriously, and were as easily cheated as the credulous
Russian peasants. Bolshevist agents went with considérable
means to neutral countries, and started an enormous propa-
ganda in favour*of Bolshevism in France, England and
America. Thus the governments of thèse countries were^
prevented for a long time from taking concerted action
against Bolshevism. They were taught to look upon the
Bolshevist gang as upon a regular governmentaccepted by the
Russian people. The invitation to Prinkipo was one of the
eflfects of this strange credulity of some of the leading poli-
ticians. Nobody dared to formulate the simple truth, that
the Bolshevists were a. gang of foreign scoundrels who repre-
sented nobody but themselves, and who were sent to Russia
by the Germans, in order to facilitate the German occu-
pation of the country.

Vain appeals.

The pathetic appeals of Mr. Lindlày from Archangel,.
now published in the White Book, led to nothing. The mur-
der of Captain Cromie had no such effect on English public
opinion as the murder of Gordon in Khartoum. In vain
Mr. Alston warned from Vladivostock in January 1919 that
there would be a shortage of foodstuffs in Europe so long as
the rields of Russia we-re unproductive, or their produce
unable to be exported, as Russia was the principal granary
bf Europe. Report after report on Bolshevist atrocities-
reached the English Foreign Office from September 191 8, and

still the Bolshevists were treated as a real government r
though nôt officially reeognised. "Tfre appeals of Sir Eliot in
February and of General Knox in March, had no greater
efifect on active intervention. **** :i z "'

Indifférence of Western governments.

This indifférence of the Western Powers and the Wes-
tern nations towards the hardships suffered by Englishmen
in Russia, can only be explained by the delusion that Bol-
shevism is a peculiarly Russian evil, which does not serious-
ly threaten other countries. Not even the success of Bolshe-
vism in Hungary and Bavaria opened the eyes of the West-
ern statesmen. In vain compétent witnesses warned that
there was a serious danger, threatening the whole of Western
civilisation. A small regular army might have jtaken Petro-
grad in 1918, and could have restored order and économie
production in Russia almost immediatery after the armistice
with Germany. The Western governments were busy discus-
ing the ternis of peace, instead of sending through Dantzig
a few hundred thousand men to help the Pôles in their
efforts against the Bolshevists. Nobody understood that Bol-
shevism was a great péril to the peace of the world, and that
without peace, order and productive work in Russia, there
could not be a lasting peace in Europe.

Alternative of Bolshevism.

The Bolshevist epidemy will inevitably be succeeded in
Russia by a renewal of autocracy and both evils, aùtocracy
and Bolshevism threaten European liberty and democracy
in a similar manner. In both cases the large majority'of a
country is subordinated to the arbitrary rule of a small
gang of ringleaders. Bolshevism and autocracy are two alter-
native symptoms of the same social disease, and succeéd each
other like excitation and dépression in mental diseases.
Serious social progress and reform are alike impossible-
under Bolshevist rule as under autocracy, because they
require really free individuals who cannot grow up in se.
succession of political convulsions.

IV. — Possible Bolshevîsm in Germany

Danger to Germany not appreciated.

Many politicians do not yet consider as a serious possi-
îhMity a Bolshevist révolution in Germany. They think
:that as the Germans threaten themselves with an outbreak
of social révolution the danger is not real, because the
Germans always announce the contrary of what happens.
It has been even said that to insist on the danger of
Bolshevism] in Germany is to help the Germans in their
attempt to terrorize the public opinion of Europe. But
some of the conditions of the success of Bolschevism in
Russia exist also in Germany. First of ail there is a great
différence between the classes and this became very promi-
nent during the war. In no other country has the privilège
of birth been so décisive for social position as in Germany,
which has been ruled for générations by a privileged caste.
The différence between soldier and offlcer in the army has
created a good deal of envy and hate, so that many soldiers
said they would kill their offlcers at the first opportunity.

Absence of true national feeling.

Another essential similarity between Germany and
Russia is the [absence of [true national feeling in the upper
classes, |who in many respects have shown in Germany the
same narrow selfishness as jin Russia, the same indifférence
to the real needs of the people. Their ambition was concen-
trated on their power in the State and the power of the State.

Worship of the State.

The worship of the State is a feeling totally différent
from genuine patriotism. The German State was an organi-
sation in which the many served the interests and ambitions
of the few. A true nation is a brotherhood in which those
who have more, either in money, intelligence or moral
strenght, serve the needs of those who have less in any
respect. Worship of a powerful State breeds ambition,
which is incompatible with the humility taught by real

patriotism. The Germans have not this spiritual unity of
ail classes and parties which the French call l'union sacrée.

Irreligiosity of the Germans.

There is one peculiarity of modem Germany which
makes a social upheaval even easier than in Russia — thç
irreligiosity of ail classes, propagated by the socialists among
workmen and by the Universities and Protestant theologians
of the type of Strauss, among thé educated people. The crude
materialism of Germany's greatest scientists, like Ostwald
or Haeckel, has no such représentatives in contemporary
France. This materialism has spread among ail classes, and
has greatly weakened the moral forces of the people. Class
warfare has been preached for more" than a génération, and
has found the most éloquent apostles among such Jews of
Germany as Marx and Lassalle.

C:edulity of the masses.

The credulity of the masses has been specially trained
during the War, and now, when ail the promises of the
military gang which prepared the war, have failed, any new
faith, advocating radical class warfare, can easily be accepted
by the masses. There is a real culprit, the privileged classes
which have made the war, and there is the feeling of military
defeat. The Germans see that Europe expects them to
work for more than a génération like slaves, in order to pay
the debt, incurred by their masters. The people may feel
that they have lost everything and have therefore nothing
more to lose, but perhaps still something to gain in a
gamblers desperate attempt to risk his very existence. If
the whole nation has to be ruined, it may appear intolérable
to look on the luxury of those privileged classes which
caused the war, and the people may delight in torturing
them in the Bolshevist fashion.

Centralisation of bureaucracy.

The centralisation of bureaucracy in Germany is still
greater than in Russia, and it is easy for a clever group of
Bolshevists to become the masters of the whole country,
preaching vengeance on the olfîcers of the Armyandonthe

: great capitalists, chiefly responsible for the war. A new
hope of an universal social révolution might still galvanize
the beaten army and create a red guard of a very resolute
character.

Another Lenin may arise.

It is true. that a Lenin would not be able to carry out
such a scheme in Germany, but Germany may find a false
saviour of her own, and she has this advantage over Russia
that she would not need to apply to the Chinese for cruelty
and frightfulness, as the Germans themselves have shown
extraordinary capacities in this direction.

Great losses.

The Germans have lost through the war even more of
their hopes and expectations than of actual Wealth or posses-
sions. Such material losses as those of ail their colonies, of
the navy, and of the Saare district, are very hard to
bear, and may drive a very unbalanced population to
madness. There is a traditional weakness in Germany for
idealistic doctrines, which disregard reality and lead to
extrêmes. Such a doctrine was Pangermanism ; and Bolshe-
vism, implying the radical destruction of the very guilty
German upper classes, might spread like wildfire, should a
clever leader arise to lead the despairing masses against the
upper classes. If the Allies do not décide to intervene
seriously in Russia, and Bolshevism breaks out in Germany,
then Western Europe also, and especially England, may be
seriously threatened. In Germany, like in Russia, there is
an alternative open : after an unsuccessful attempt at social
révolution, autocratie government may be restored, and will
be even more reactionary than ever beforè. The number
of real citizens who understand liberty and love it, is
too small in Germany as well as in Russia, and thèse two
countries will be apt for a long time to corne to join their
ressoureps, in order to destroy European peace and liberty,
either by militarism or by social disorganisation of the
Bolshevist type.

— 3i —

V. — Poland and Bolshevism

Strong Poland needed.

The only force which can prevent the outbreak in Ger-
many, is a really strong Poland. It was a very serious mistake
to deprive Poland of her national harbour and -of the posses-
sion of her national river from source to mouth. Poland
without Dantzig cannot be a really great Power > and the
Allies have, in this case, treated Poland more like a beaten
enemy, than as an Ally.

Conditions of résistance.

Poland has two conditions, which make her specially
able to resist Bolshevism and autocracy : an intense national
feeling in ail classes, and a very intense religiosity. She has
also a great number of small landowners, most refractory
to Bolshevism. But she has also a very great number of Jews,
who are the most suitable human material for a Bolshevist
upheaval. The Polish Jews are misérable, dirty, and full of
greed and envy. They emancipate themselves from ail moral
scruples as soon as they give up.the religion of their ances-
tors. By their greed they ave accumulated wealth during
the war without sharing the risk, and they have produced
so much adverse feeling that sometime this led to violent
outbreaks of public indignation, which were represented as
massacres of the Jews in the Jewish press ail over the world.
In truth very few Jews have suffered in Poland but they have
awakened by their attitude a deep mistrust of the Jewish
propaganda of Bolshevism.

Poland weakened by the Allies.

The {disregard for the most legitimate Polish national
aspirations, shown by the Peace- conférence, has greatly
weakened Poland. It has produced throughout the whole
nation a sensé of military defeat, and of German victory.
The Polish people is intensely religious and patriotic, but
has been taught by its three enemies disrespect for every
authority and contempt for every government. Therefore it
-is not easy to govern in Poland, and the Polish government

needs success in its foreign politics, in order to maintain its

prestige in its own country. The décisions of the Peace:

Conférence as to Dantzig, Teschen, East Prussia, Lithuania,.

if unfavourable to Polish national aspirations, will be looked

upon by public opinion as German victories, and as defeats.

for the Polish national government.

" - . " ~ » ^~ ' - ■ -

Natural strength of Poland.

Notwithstanding ail thèse unfavourable circumstarices,*
there are certain conditions which make of Poland a natural
bulwark against Russian as well as German Bolshevism.
The Polish nation has always had intensely religious
leaders, and ail classes are united in this fervent fâith»
which has been unanimously professed by the greatest
Polish thinkers and poets. Though the Pôles have never had^
any real antisemitism such as exists in Germany or Russiay
they have an innate distrust of the Jews, and no Trotzky'
could govern in Warsaw as he does in Môscow or Petrograd'..
What distinguishesthe Pôles from most other nations whichi
have taken part in the war, is their readiness, like the English,
to go on fighting, though they have suffered more through
the war thanany other nation. This readiness to fight for the
integrity of their territory, is the resuit of an intense patrio--
tism which unités ail classes in Poland to an extent which no ■
Western nation has ever experienced, because nowhere such;
cruel foreign oppression has lasted for more than a century.,

Difficultés of the situation.

But the difficultés of the situation in Poland are very
great. The country is as thoroughly ruined by the
Germans, as if the Bolshevist déluge had already overrun it.
The Polish army lacks munitions, clothing, shoes and food ;
ail the necessities of life reach extravagant prices, and there
is no direct communication with the Western Allies,
because thèse have neglected the military occupation of
Dantzig, which ought to have been one of the most impor-
tant conditions of the armistice.

Enemies of Poland.

The Pôles have not only the Bolshevists against them,
but also the Tchèques and tne Ukrainians, two peoples very

— 33 -

ripe for Bolshevism, because they are very much under-
German influence. The Germans help not only the Bolshe-
vists, but also the Ukrainians, and the Ukrainian people is
led by a gang very similai to the BolsHevists. The true
Ukrainians are not enemies of the Pôles, as they have been
voluntarily united with Poland for centuries, and have
never been able to form a State of their own. The State
which now bears the name "of Ukraine, is an artificial
German création, and serves the aims of the Germans. The
real advantage of Pôles and |Ukrainians requires their close
union, while war between thèse two peoples benefits only
the Germans, who have succeeded in provoking it, because
the Allies have not insisted on German démobilisation, and
on the return of ail German officers from Poland and
Ukraine to Germany.

Material* and moral help needed.

Under thèse circumstances it is necessary to help Poland
in her struggle for European civilisation against Bolshevism.-
This help must consist not only in the supply of food v
munitions and cloihing, but also in the sincère récognition
of the truth that the partitions of Poland were a crime, and
that the full reconstitution of Poland as a great Power is>
necessary for the peace and security of Europe.

Russia and Poland.

Russia has tried to take the place of Poland, but has
failed. The récognition of the elementary truth that a free
Poland, and not a despotic Russia, is the natural ally of the
Western powers, will be of great moral importance to the
Pôles, and will increase the force of their 'résistance against
Bolshevism. The despotism of the Bolshevists will inevitably
be followed by other despotisms in Russia, and many géné-
rations must work in order to build several free States, on
the ruins of the Russian Empire. Meanwhile, Europe cannot
count on Russia, but can fully rely on Poland. The secular
struggle between despotic Mtfscovy and a free Poland led,,
in the XVIII century, to the extinction of ail liberty in
Central Europe. It is time now, in the XX century, to-
recognise that the parutions of Poland wronged not only-

Poland, but Européen liberty, and that only afull restitution
of ail what three German dynasties have taken away from
Poland, can secure peace, order and freedom in Central and
Eastern Europe.

Poland, Rumania and Serbia.

Poland as a great Fédération, including Lithuania and
Ruthenia, extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea, in
close union with Rumania Bohemia and Serbia, will form
the necessary bulwark for preventing German influence in
Russia. Germany, between a powerful Poland and France,
will be obliged to capitulate, and to give up her dreams
of world domination. As long as Germany can reach Russia,
Russia will remain a péril to European peace and ci îli-
sation.

German plans.

If Europe distrusts Poland, Poland will be unable to
fulfil her historié mission of defending European liberty
against Asiatic despotism. Asiatic despotism has pene-
trated through Prussia into Germany, and Germany threat-
ens to organise the whole of Eastern Europe and Northern
Asia for the destruction of Western civilisation, either by
the force of a strong army or by the social disorganisation
of Bolshevism. There is no nation better able to prevent
this danger than Poland, provided she is sincerely helped
by the Allies.

VI. — Danger to Western civilisation.

Favourable conditions for Bolshevism.

If, on the other hand, the Allies, for the sake of peace
with Germany, give up the principles for which the war lias
been fought, then Poland, situated between a Bolshevist or
autocratie Russia and a Bolshevist or autocratie Germany,
will again be the victim of her isolation and of the indiffé-
rence of Europe to her fate. But Bolshevism or autocracy.

— 35 —

triumphant from the Ural to the Rhine, will also seriously
threaten England, France and Italy. There are, in thèse
countries, several conditions favourable to Bolshevist under-
lakings, especially the prevailing irreligion of the masses,
leading to materialistic tendencies. A great number of work-
men have been accustomed, during the war, to very high
wages, which it will be impossible to continue to pay in time
of peace,or,ifthey arepaid, the prices of the necessities will
be so muchincreased, that the high wages will be insufficient.
The ruling classes have not yet been able to organise the
workers, so as to secure for them permanent employment.
While a real improvement of social conditions requires
•continuons work, strikes occur everywhere, and from time
to time there is a menace of a gênerai strike, which would
paralyse the whole of social life. The war has given great
wealth to the individuals who are morally the most défi-
cient — the profiteers of war, headed by big international
financial concerns which disregard national interests, and
awake hatred and contempt in the masses.

Dissatisfaction of the masses.

There is a widely spread suspicion amongst the masses
against the political leaders, and a certain feeling of defeat,
because the aims for which millions have fought and died,
seem to be disregarded by the officiai représentatives of the
Great Powers at the Peace Conférence. The new order pro-
posed for Europe is the fruit of compromise, and cannot
satisfy those who désire justice and liberty. The différence
made between Great Powers and small nations, the com-
plète subordination of European nations to five great Powers,
two of which have never participated in European affairs,
produces on the masses the impression that thèse affairs
are managed without due regard to the legitimate aspira-
tions of the nations.

Bolshevist propaganda.

Ail thèse circumstances facilitate Bolshevist propaganda,
for which the Bolshevists have accumulated enormous
means in neutral countries. Russia is exhausted, and the
Bolshevist gang has to seek new victims, in order to satisfy

r

its greed and ambition of power. England with her labour
troubles, withunrest in Ireland, Egypt and India, is a tempt-
pting prey, and promises great spoils. There are légions of
English-speaking Bolshevist agents in England and America.
Bolshevism has gained vast expérience in Russia, and also
the meâns of developping its propaganda. The Bolshevists
came to Russia with a few hundred thousand pounds of
German money to start with; now they have millions at their
disposai, and a greatly increased number of well trained
agents. The war has destroyed the balance of mind in many
gifted writers and publicists, who see clearly the great evils
of the présent time, but cannot find by themselves efficient
remédies. * They can easily be won by promises of social
reform based on the communistic programme. A gênerai
revolt against the existing order in the name of a better
future organisation of society is therefore not impossible in
Western countries, if the Bolshevist conspiracy dominâtes
Germany and Poland. Outbreaks in Hungary and Bavaria,
and the Bolshevist menace of a gênerai strike in Switzerland,
show that such upheavals are possible.
< s . / ' - • ■ v ' ■■ - •

Protection against'Bolshevism.

It is true that Bolshevism could not be so easily estab-
lished in France and England as in Germany, and
probably could not last so long as in Russia. In Western
countries there is more patriotism in ail classes, and a
serious striving for social reform. In France the great
number of small capitalists and landowners would offer an
energetic résistance to every communistic conspiracy. In
England the sane tradition of fairness and respect for
property is a safeguard against the collective madness of
radical class warfare. There is no such credulity of the
masses in France and in England as in Russia or Germany.

Prévention better than pure.

But the unexpected often happens, and we must foresee
very serious difficultés in the near future, which will be

* See for instance, Miss Louise Bryant Six red months in Russia r
London, Heinemann 1919.

- 3 7 -

increased, if ail industrial and agricultural production is
hindered in the greatest part of Europe, from the Rhine to
the Ural Mountains. Therefore it is the serious duty of
governments and nations to take such measures as will
render the progress of Bolshevism towards the West
impossible. A great fire cannot be extinguished easily
wheîi it has spread over a large area, but it is easy to
prevent its extension when it begins. Bolshevism has
destroyed Russia, and seriously threatens Poland and
Germany. There are certainly some men, amongst those who
in England and France have withstood four years of war,
who would gladly volunteer for further service in the
défense of Western civilisation, if they understood the danger
that threatens to destroy everything dear to us. Such men
.should be sent to Poland, and an efficient service of régula r
approvisation over Dantzig should be started immediately.
Polish Cause and anti-Bolshevism.

The Polish Cause is identical with anti-Bolshevism, and
Poland cannot be free if Bolshevism prevails in Europe.
Therefore Poland deserves to be trusted and helped to the
utmost. A solemn proclamation by the Allies of the rights
of Poland to Dantzig and ail the territory which belonged
to the Pôles in 1772, would show the Pôles that the Allies
really mean-to start an era of international justice, after the
long period of the reign^of force and of political compromise.
This would increase their forces in the very difficult
struggie. Poland must become again what she was for
centuries, a great European Power, and not remain a poor
nation under foreign protection.

Usurpation of Russia.

Europe has seen that Russia was unable to keep lier prom-
ises and obligations. Russia had not only taken the greatest
part of Polish territory, but had usurped the place of
Poland in Europe. She has had over a century to show her
utter incapacity of filling that place. Now this place must
be restored to Poland with jthe territory belonging to her.

Hindenburg's opinion.

Hindenburg himself testifies, as Bismarck did in former

times, that the independence of Poland would be a mortal
blow to Germany, In his speech to the Hilfsschùt\enveveitr
fur Oberschlesien in April 19 19, he said that the Pôles
alone are able to organise and to lead the Slavs. If the
Western Allies accept this testimony of a beaten enemy as
trustworthy, they must givé up the German conceptions of
small States between Germany and Russia, and help the Pôles
to build a really strong Fédération of Central Europe,
cxtending from Finland to Greece and isolating Germany
from Russia by a barrier of moie than hundred twenty
million citizen conscious of their national rights.

CONTENTS

.

Préface . p. — 3-7"

I. THE BRITISH WHITE BOOK ON BOLSHEVISM. 9-15

The Netherlands Minister — Mr Lockhart — Colonel Kimens 9-12
— Mr. Lindley — Mr. Alston — Rev. Lombard 13-15

II. GENERAL CHARAGTERISTICS OF BOLSHEVISM. 16-2&

Foreign and antinational- character — Insincerity of Bolshe- 16

vists — They have done.great harm to labour — Contempt for 17

every superiority — use of false names and forged money — 17

misundersfood Marxism — Marx and Lenin — wrong appréciation 18-19>

of talent — shortsightedness — cruelty — Torture — destruction 19-20'

of wealth — inévitable reaction — instability of future govern- 21-22

ments. 22

- ■

III. BOLSHEVISM IN RUSSIA. 22-27

Wrong analogies — Bolshevism broughtfrom Germany — diffe- 22-23

rence of classes — bureaucratie centralisation — sensé of 23-24

defeat — no patriotism — religiosity without direction — readi- 24-25-

ness for change — false information — vain appeals — alternative 25-27

of Bolshevism. 27

IV. POSSIBLE BOLSHEVISM IN GERMANY. 28-30

Danger to Germany not appreciated — absence of true natio- 28-
nal feeling — worship of the State — irreligiosity of the 28-29»
Germans — credulity of the masses — centralisation of bureau- 29
cracy — another Lenin might arise. x 30

V. POLAND AND BOLSHEVISM. 31-34

Strong Roland needed — Poland weakened by the Allies — 31
natural strength of Poland — difficultés of the situation — 31-32
Enemies of Poland — Material and moral help needed — 32-33.
Russia and Poland — Poland Rumania and Serbia — German 33-34
plans. 34

VI. DANGER TO WESTERN CIVILISATION. 34-38

Favourable conditions for Bolshevism — dissatisfaction of 34-35.

the masses — Bolshevist propaganda — protection against 35-36

Bolshevism — prévention better than cure — Polish cause and 36-37

anti-Bolshevism — usurpation of Russia — Hindenburg's 3a
opinion .